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Background: Performance-based financing is increasingly being applied in a variety of contexts, with the
expectation that it can improve the performance of health systems. However, while there is a growing literature on
implementation issues and effects on outputs, there has been relatively little focus on interactions between PBF
and health systems and how these should be studied. This paper aims to contribute to filling that gap by
developing a framework for assessing the interactions between PBF and health systems, focusing on low and
middle income countries. In doing so, it elaborates a general framework for monitoring and evaluating health
system reforms in general.
Methods: This paper is based on an exploratory literature review and on the work of a group of academics and
PBF practitioners. The group developed ideas for the monitoring and evaluation framework through exchange of
emails and working documents. Ideas were further refined through discussion at the Health Systems Research
symposium in Beijing in October 2012, through comments from members of the online PBF Community of Practice
and Beijing participants, and through discussion with PBF experts in Bergen in June 2013.
Results: The paper starts with a discussion of definitions, to clarify the core concept of PBF and how the different
terms are used. It then develops a framework for monitoring its interactions with the health system, structured
around five domains of context, the development process, design, implementation and effects. Some of the key
questions for monitoring and evaluation are highlighted, and a systematic approach to monitoring effects
proposed, structured according to the health system pillars, but also according to inputs, processes and outputs.
Conclusions: The paper lays out a broad framework within which indicators can be prioritised for monitoring and
evaluation of PBF or other health system reforms. It highlights the dynamic linkages between the domains and the
different pillars. All of these are also framed within inter-sectoral and wider societal contexts. It highlights the
importance of differentiating short term and long term effects, and also effects (intended and unintended) at
different levels of the health system, and for different sectors and areas of the country. Outstanding work will
include using and refining the framework and agreeing on the most important hypotheses to test using it, in
relation to PBF but also other purchasing and provider payment reforms, as well as appropriate research methods
to use for this task.
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Performance-based financing (PBF) is based on a powerful
assumption: that individuals and organizations are mo-
tivated to perform better by incentives. It is increasingly
being applied in a variety of ways and contexts, with
varying objectives, and with the overall expectation that
it can improve the performance of health systems. How-
ever, while there is a growing body of evidence on the
design and implementation of PBFa [1-3], as well as
some evidence of effectiveness from recent impact eval-
uations [4,5], published evidence on the interactions
between PBF and health systems and how these should
be monitored and studied remains very limited, particu-
larly in developing countries.
The first Cochrane systematic review of paying providers
for performance in low and middle income countries
(LMICs) concluded that ‘almost all dimensions of poten-
tial impact remain under-studied, including intended and
unintended impact on health outcomes, equity, organisa-
tional change, user payments and satisfaction, resource
use and staff satisfaction’ [6]. This is an important gap in
that PBF is increasingly viewed as an intervention which
targets systemic change [7]. The review suggested that
‘evaluations should take a broad perspective and consider
wider health systems effects, intended or unintended’ [6].
This paper aims to contribute to filling that gap by devel-
oping a framework for assessing the interactions between
PBF and health systems and for understanding how differ-
ent ways of designing and implementing PBF ultimately
affect the impact of PBF. In doing so, a broader framework
which can be applied to monitoring and evaluating health
systems reforms is developed. This is intended to comple-
ment other ongoing ventures, such as the monitoring and
evaluation toolkit which was recently developed to support
more rigorous impact evaluations [8]. It fits with a wider
call for more ‘systems thinking’ [9], as well as calls for a
knowledge exchange on PBF which includes different
stakeholder groups [10].
To date most evaluations of PBF have focused on the
question of whether it works, which is understood largely
in terms of attributing increases in specific service outputs
to performance incentives. While this is a valid question
that needs further study, it does not do justice to the range
of effects (positive and negative) which such a systemic
intervention can have, nor does it address the lack of
knowledge about how to better design and implement
PBF. The focus of this paper is to map out these wider
issues, with the aim of encouraging broader empirical
work and more rigorous and consistent monitoring and
evaluation in the future, on PBF and related reforms. In
doing so, it builds on earlier work to evaluate health finan-
cing reforms, such as [11].
The paper starts with a discussion of definitions, to clar-
ify the core concept of PBF and how the different relatedterms are used. Based on an understanding of how PBF
mechanisms might in theory strengthen health systems
and using the WHO health system building blocks [12],
we then adapt a framework for monitoring its interactions
with the health system, providing the reader with some
key issues to consider when developing their monitoring
and evaluation systems. The final section discusses the
research agenda which arises from it.
Background on PBF – definitions and terminology
The plethora of terms commonly used in this field –
results-based financing, performance-based incentives,
pay for performance, performance-based contracting [13],
conditional cash transfers [14], cash on delivery, and
others – can cause confusion. At their heart is a resource
transfer which is dependent on some form of performance
criteria being met. However, that is a very open definition
which could be taken to cover all payments systems.
Building on Musgrove’s work [15], we take results-based
financing, performance-based incentives and pay for per-
formance [16] to be over-arching labels, covering all forms
of supply-side and demand-side conditional financing.
Conditional cash transfers are commonly used to denote
payments or near-cash transfers such as vouchers to be-
neficiaries. Some terms are specific to aid, such as cash
on delivery [17] or output-based aid. Performance-based
contracting is used when contracts are drawn up with non-
state actors, such as non-governmental organizations [18].
This paper focuses on one approach within the group,
PBF, which is chosen because it is one of the most com-
mon approaches being tested in low and middle income
countries at present and, secondly, because it involves a
more ambitious change to the organization of health
systems. The core features of PBF, as currently practiced
in reform packages such as those implemented at scale
in Central and West Africa, are summarized as follows:
 They take a supply-side approach, meaning
performance-based incentives are earned by service
providers
 Payments are targeted at individual health facilities
and administrations, often with trickle-down to
health workers
 There is most often some split of functions between
regulation, purchasing, fund-holding, verification and
service delivery, although the practices vary by context
 Payments are linked to outputs, modified by quality
indicators
PBF can have a number of objectives [6,7,19], including:
 to increase the allocative efficiency of health services
(by encouraging the provision of high priority and
cost effective services)
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the productivity of existing resources at facility level
such as building, equipment and health staff )
 to improve effectiveness of services by greater
attention to quality of care
 to improve both coverage rates and equity of
outcomes (for example, by encouraging expansion of
services to hard-to-reach groups or allowing
facilities to reduce fees)
 to increase accountability to stakeholders, as a goal
per se but also as an instrument to increase
responsiveness of health services and consolidate the
collective commitment to finance it.
The core concept is to promote a results-orientation
by linking incentives to desired outputs and encouraging
entrepreneurial behavior by staff and managers. This is
done by establishing a set of more explicit contractual
arrangements between different players. Payments do
not reflect real service production costs, but aim at
investing in front line services and modifying behavior,
while leveraging existing resources in the health system.
According to the definition adopted by the African
PBF Community of Practice, in August 2010, PBF ‘applies
market forces but seeks to correct market failures to attain
health gains’. Providers are assumed to have, or must be
given and supported in using, the autonomy to be able to
respond in a creative way to overcome bottlenecks in
attaining results at their level. All of these features indicate
that PBF is clearly a systems’ change, involving changes in
the relationships between actors, structures and processes,
as for other provider payment reforms [20]. This means
that we need to think systematically about how systems’
arrangements affect the design and practice of PBF, and
vice versa.
Methods
This paper is based on an exploratory literature review
focused on monitoring PBF in relation to health systems
in LMICs and on the work of a group of academics and
PBF practitioners. The group developed ideas for the
monitoring and evaluation framework through exchange
of emails, working documents and discussion at the
Health Systems Research symposium in Beijing in October
2012, where a workshop was held on this topic. It was
further refined through circulating a draft for comments
to members of the online PBF Community of Practice,
which has more than a thousand members (in July 2013),
mixing implementers (the largest group), Ministry of
Health staff, researchers and international institutional
members. 62% of its members are based in low and mid-
dle income countries.b A draft was also shared with those
who had attended the workshop in Beijing and left their
contacts (25 people). Comments from participants werereceived and incorporated in January 2013. The frame-
work was further presented to a meeting of a group of 35
PBF experts and researchers for comment in Bergen in
June 2013.c
The literature review built on recent reviews which
had been undertaken and on the knowledge of the
working group members. The focus was on mapping
existing frameworks and evidence for health systems
effects of PBF, and what drives them. Few publications
on this specific topic were found, though there is an
increasing wider literature on PBF. In general, this field
of literature is growing but remains largely internal. As
noted in a recent review, ‘Of the 100 or so documents
reviewed for this paper, only a few were peer-reviewed
articles. Many are descriptive briefs or reports by
project funders and implementers’ [21]. The framework
was therefore developed inductively by the author
group, based on their collective experience and a fruitful
dialogue between those with experience of designing
and operating PBF reform packages with those who
have studied them.
Results
Adapting a health systems-oriented monitoring and
evaluation framework and applying it to PBF
It follows from our definition of PBF that it should, if
implemented fully, involve a change in institutional roles
and enforcement mechanisms, as well as strengthening of
management functions (such as result-based planning and
performance management). The interaction of changed
incentives, sanctions, institutional changes and supporting
mechanisms with existing intrinsic and extrinsic motiv-
ation of providers will determine any behavioral changes,
which in turn will affect organizational and health systems
performance [22].
This starts to provide some of the key nodes which
should be reflected in health systems monitoring and
evaluation. These should include, at a minimum:
 Initial endowments (roles of actors, their access to
information, degree of autonomy, areas of negotiation
and uncertainty, rules and norms, access to resources,
power relationships, accountability etc.)
 Initial performance of actors at different levels
 Changes to both the initial endowments and the
initial performance and factors driving that - again
 What the initial theory of change is, in relation to
PBF, and how that is modified as implementation
proceeds
Assessments of these should be based on health sys-
tems data but also incorporate the views of different
stakeholder groups. The theory of change is commonly
elaborated during the programme development process,
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key agents and institutions and through what mecha-
nisms and interactions it is expected to generate positive
change.
A systems perspective implies a dynamic perspective,
focusing not just on one-way effects, but interactions,
feedback loops and also changes over time. The purpose
is not just to document changes but also understand
why they happened (or did not happen) and what were
the underlying mechanisms and contextual factors of
significance. Recognising that health systems are com-
plex adaptive systems is especially relevant for PBF, as
for other health system reforms [23]. We argue that this
requires an understanding and documentation of five
domains (Figure 1), and the continuous interactions
between them over time, which will feed back into the
underlying theory of change for PBF (what it is aiming
to change, and how that is expected to occur).
Context
It is clear that the starting conditions in the health system
and more broadly will be crucial to whether and how PBF
is implemented, and that PBF in turn may have an import-
ant influence on those conditions. These context factors1.Context & its
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Figure 1 The five domains for understanding PBF-health systems inteoperate at organizational, local, national and international
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(or a combination of both). This section focuses on the
influence of context on the operation of PBF reform
packages, while in domain five we consider the influence
of PBF on the health system.
At the operational level, context includes all elements
not under the control of the organizational level which
is under scrutiny. Other prior funding streams and
access to resources will certainly influence PBF results,
such as available input-based funding for recurrent costs
or medical supplies like drugs, as well as the volume and
uses of user fees. Often these different resource compo-
nents are reformed at the same time as the introduction
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PBF include organizational and management culture
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difficult to develop the necessary split of functions to avoid
conflicts of interest in accountability, as interest groups
are already entrenched. The converse may be true in fra-
gile states [25-27]. Where facilities are already accustomed
to a degree of autonomous financial management, such as
under the Bamako Initiative, it may be easier to introduce
PBF.
In the wider health sector, it could be argued that there
are a number of technical factors which will enhance the
chances of PBF succeeding, such as the existence of man-
agement competences, having the right size and right
skills-mix of human resources for health, the availability of
medicines/equipment and infrastructure etc. However,
some of the PBF success stories come from countries
where a number of conditions were not right, such as
Burundi [25,26]. It may be that these worse-off conditions
make the creation of new financing and governance struc-
tures more urgent, less resisted, and more influential.
The context of health worker pay will also be crucial
to the operation of PBF [27] – starting pay levels and
conditions, rules governing outside work, sources of exter-
nal pay, staff management and accountability systems, all
of these will directly influence the effects of PBF on staff
motivation and behavior.
In terms of the influence of the wider context, PBF is
challenged by features such as restrictive public finance
rules (e.g. health facilities not being permitted to have
their own bank accounts) and underdeveloped banking
systems. Indeed, changing some of these constraints may
be an outcome of PBF [7]. The macro-economic context
is also important: in a growing economy it will be easier
to free funds for new initiatives (or to take over initiatives
which started as donor-funded pilots). The international
environment affects the macro-economic context as well
as the availability and conditionality of aid flows.
Domains 2, 3, and 4 cover the three stages of designing
and implementing PBF. This is the complex ‘black box’ of
what actually evolves on the ground and why.
Policy development process
In addition to contextual features, it is important to
understand the process through which PBF was intro-
duced, debated, prioritized, crafted and rolled-out. These
will influence perceptions of key actors, implementation,
and therefore ultimately effects, short and long-term.
Sometimes PBF is introduced or ‘piloted’ by an exter-
nal financing agency, because these may perceive PBF as
increasing their value for money, or prefer to channel
their funding directly to the service delivery level [21].
This may lead to hesitations on the host government
side, because of fears that PBF may introduce new donor
dependency, especially if governments were insufficiently
involved in the development process. Governments mayhowever be more open to receive funding in the initial
phases of the PBF reform process to invest in capacity
building and in structures to create PBF-readiness.
The political interest in and commitment to PBF, and
whether it is seen as consistent with or contrary to na-
tional priorities, will be critical, as well as whether it is
linked with other strategies, such as health worker reten-
tion schemes, decentralization, or different approaches
to extending health coverage [28].
Other stakeholders’ (national and local, health system
and community) perspectives are also important. What
were their expectations of PBF? What were the entry
points for the introduction of PBF (such as poor health
results, or pressure from donors)? Were they involved in
its development and in setting priorities within it? What
were their interests and experiences in relation to PBF?
Did they experience PBF as indigenous or as an idea
imposed from outside?
There are also trade-offs to be made between degrees
of centralization of the negotiation process. A national
level package and pricing allows for consistent priorities
to be set, while in a more diverse setting, with greater
local capacity, there may be advantages to allowing local
level negotiation, to increase ownership of the process.
If PBF is seen as potentially overcoming bottlenecks
(internal and external factors that impede performance)
in the health system, it will be important to understand
what these bottlenecks are (or how they are perceived)
prior to the introduction of PBF and how PBF was con-
ceptualized to address these supply- or demand-side prob-
lems. This conceptualization is necessary in order to know
if and how PBF’s impact on them can be assessed. For
each system bottleneck that stakeholders intend to study,
it is necessary to identify and describe any other reforms
intended to address the same problem. How does PBF
reinforce or diverge from other health policies and plans
targeting the same problem? [29]? How do they interact?
What is the context of related reform experiences in the
area?
PBF can be expected to work best when there is un-
derused capacity in the health system, such that limited
additional resources can leverage a large increase in out-
puts. Where this is not the case – where it motivates
more activity but the system is already under strain –
then the effects on services may be less positive. It is
therefore important during the design process to have
baseline measures of service production capacity and an
understanding of the factors which underlie it.
Design features
Domain 3 seeks to understand how different ways of de-
signing PBF ultimately affect its systems effects. There are
two main lines of research inquiry regarding PBF design.
Firstly, the question of whether the design features and
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rewards motivate providers to behave as intended? Are
the observed changes in provider behavior due to the
reward or to the other organizational and operational
changes that accompany PBF? The second area of research
is looking at how specific PBF features or structures may
cause an effect beyond the immediate, intended results.
A key element in the design is defining the priority re-
sults to be strengthened through PBF (the size, compos-
ition and focus of the service package). Clearly, it is
important to understand which services are rewarded,
whether they are defined as absolute outputs or as rates
(though these are seen as harder to measure) [30], whether
they are quantitative only or include quality indicators,
and whether the quality indicators (whether relating to
processes or outputs) are stand-alone or used to weight
quantity indicators. Learning here needs to focus on
observing whether one way of structuring indicators and
targets works better than the alternatives in motivating
the desired behavior in different contexts.
The financial and non-financial incentives attached to
the results will also vary, both in their absolute amounts
and their potential importance to the recipient organiza-
tions, depending on other sources of available financing,
on the availability of other inputs, on the cost of doing
business and relative pay of health workers. There is no
consensus on the proportion of health worker (or facility)
pay which should, in theory, be derived from PBF pay-
ments in order to motivate better performance. The ‘living
wage’ argument would suggest that a higher proportion is
justified in contexts where basic pay is low, as is the case
in many low income countries. However, there is a con-
trary argument that small amounts can be motivating
when absolute earnings are low. In one study, positive
effects were documented with an increase in doctors’ rev-
enue of only 5% [31]. However, in most studies to date in
low and middle income countries, the impact on health
worker revenues (not to mention behavioural outcomes)
has not been documented [21]. This is an area requiring
further theoretical and empirical research. The first line
question here is whether the amount and payment mode
is motivating the recipients to behave as intended.
It is important to understand to what extent the health
system context issues, identified in Domain 1, were
taken into account in the design of the PBF reform pack-
age and its institutional arrangements, including for verifi-
cation and enforcement. Were PBF arrangements adapted
to that context, or were they introduced as a completely
new type of health system organization? For example: did
PBF use the existing M&E system or was a new data
collection system set-up specifically for PBF [29]? Was
PBF embedded in the existing governance structure, or
was a new PBF structure set-up? How did it affect or build
on community voice mechanisms [32]? The first linequestion here is: is the chosen arrangement working?
The broader question is: how does the design of the
PBF reform package affect the operation of the wider
health system and the responses of key actors? These
questions will be linked to the PBF introduction and
development process.
In relation to geographic inequity, remote or poorer
areas are at a disadvantage to reach targets and receive
PBF rewards.d Therefore, some PBF reform packages are
designed to have easier targets or adjusted payments that
favour less privileged areas (a similar approach to needs-
based resource allocation formulae such as that used in
the UK). For example, DRC pays 15% higher capitation
payments for more remote provinces. Burundi pays 40%
higher [25,28,33]. The monitoring and evaluation question
here is whether these features do in practice improve
geographic equity.
If PBF was set-up as a contracting approach, which
usually is the case, it may be evaluated to what extent
this influenced later outcomes [34]. If PBF is designed to
increase autonomy for providers, transparency of results,
and accountability, these are important health system
effects to monitor over time.
The distribution of some or all of the PBF resources to
staff is another key design feature. It is assumed that
PBF affects health systems mainly through changing the
attitude and the behavior of staff, but there is still little
published research on how that works [21], though some
interesting case studies are starting to emerge [35]. The
type of incentive (financial or non-financial), amounts,
the system for allocating them (and whether this is per-
ceived as fair or not), the other changes to performance
management or working conditions which accompany
the PBF reforms, all of these – in addition to starting
conditions and processes of consultation – will determine
how PBF affects staff performance. These may be very dif-
ferent for different types of staff, according to their roles
and sectors. Reform packages which do not pass on finan-
cial incentives to staff may nevertheless in some contexts
achieve good results.e
Implementation
Under implementation, it is important to compare the
theory of the intervention, as laid down in the design,
with practice [22]. Changes to design are not necessarily
problematic, in that they may be necessary iterative
changes, made as a policy hits the reality of the health
system. However, it is important to document the actual
implementation – how stakeholders were informed of
the policy, how their capacity was built to take on new
roles, whether funds were disbursed as planned and on
time, how verification and counter-verification took
place, and so on. The down-stream actions are also very
important to whether and how the mechanism works –
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from PBF? How did they adapt their operations in order
to respond to the changed incentives introduced by
PBF? A case study of performance-based contracting in
Uganda illustrates the importance of effective implemen-
tation, and also of understanding the emergent behav-
iours and adaptations of key actors which can take place
in response to such intervention [36].
Health system effects
All health system building blocks are likely to be affected
by the introduction of PBF, however for simplicity we have
focused on service delivery, human resources, governance
and health financing in the framework presented in
Table 1. The impacts on commodities are built into the
service delivery component, while information systems are
regarded as part of the governance function. The effects
are organized along a simple results-chain logic – moving
from inputs to processes for organizing them, then out-
puts (and back again – there are strong linkages in both
directions, as well as between the pillars). The output
changes will be expected to contribute to overall health
system goals, including improved health outcomes.Table 1 Framework for monitoring and evaluating PBF’s heal
Result chain Service delivery Human resources
Inputs Development of quality
assurance/improvement tools
(like treatment protocols,
scorecards)
Changes to working condit
for staff and staff remunera
Changes to the availability of
necessary infrastructure,
medicines and supplies
Any change to central leve
HRH policies and allocation
Changes to training (e.g. on
good prescribing and
evidence-based treatment
protocols)
Processes Changes to organization of
services
-Effects on quality and
convenience for users
(“acceptability”). Effects on
availability of services,
including support services, like
diagnostics, lab tests
Changes to availability,
retention and distribution o
staff (of different types).
Change to staff motivation,
satisfaction, teamwork and
working patterns, and skills
Outputs Changes to utilization of services
(targeted and untargeted).
Changes to coverage – absolute
and for different socioeconomic
groups. Changes to quality of
care (cure rates, readmission,
detection etc.). Changes to
range and type of services
(appropriate to local needs or
not)
Changes to staff behavior
(working hours, absenteeism
dual practice, informal
charging etc.). Evidence of
changes to responsiveness
quality of care provided by
staff
Health system
goals
Better health; greater equity in
health; financial protection;
responsiveness of health
systemOutputs are presented here in a neutral way – as these
may be positive as well as negative. Unintended effects,
such as perverse effects in service delivery (e.g. changes
in services that were not incentivized through PBF),
should be anticipated as far as possible and actively
monitored. Effects on coverage and affordability should
be monitored in absolute terms and for different socio-
economic groups.
Although outputs are presented in separate pillars, it
will also be important to look for linkages across differ-
ent pillars and between levels of the health system, and
areas of synergy (or, indeed, tension), as well as positive
and negative feedbacks.
Discussion
We have adapted a framework for monitoring a health
system reform, focusing on its application to the introduc-
tion of PBF. This provides an interesting case study not
only because this topic is very current, with a fast growth
in application in a low and middle income countries at
present, but also because PBF has potentially widespread
effects in relation to resource allocation, purchasing and
provider payments, with knock-on implications for all ofth systems effects
Governance Health financing
ions
tion
Development of governance
capacity & systems – e.g.
separation of functions
Volume of funds, relative to
other sources (globally, and at
facility level); and their predictability
and variability over time
l Investments in improving
information and M&E systems
Costs of related investments
Changes to participation of
external stakeholders –
especially those representing
demand-side
Effect on other financing sources,
as relevant. Changes to funds
reaching front-line providers
f
job
sets
Changes in performance
management systems at all
levels. Changes to
accountability, autonomy,
organizational culture and
contractual obligations of main
actors. Development of
leadership skills, at different
levels
Allocation of funds (across
services, facility types and areas)
& link to local needs. Changes to
transactions costs (including
costs of new governance
arrangements, monitoring etc.).
How funds are used and any
knock-on financial effects (e.g.
changes to charges for users)
,
and
Changes to health data:
regularity, reliability,
comprehensiveness. Greater (or
less) voice for stakeholders,
especially patients. Strategic
purchasing practiced.
Centralisation/decentralization
of functions within sector;
changed power relationships
within system
Changes to technical & allocative
efficiency of services.
Sustainability of funding
mechanisms & their synergies
over time. Changes to
affordability for users & financial
protection – overall and
disaggregated
Witter et al. BMC Health Services Research 2013, 13:367 Page 8 of 10
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/13/367the health systems blocks. The aim of the framework was
to broaden the dialogue around PBF and give a more
system-oriented lens for its study. There are however limi-
tations to the approach taken. A recent search found 41
different frameworks for conceptualising health systems
[37]. These were grouped into frameworks for under-
standing health systems, comparing them, informing
change, and evaluating it. The authors further grouped the
frameworks according to whether they focused on sub-
systems, whole systems, or supra-systems (focussing on
linkages with other sectors). Within this typology, this
paper focuses on the whole system, and in particular on
evaluating changes to it. While the wider linkages outside
the sector are important, the interactions within the health
sector are sufficiently complex that we focus our frame-
work on understanding and monitoring them. Other
conceptualisations could have been employed, such as the
‘control knobs’ model [38], which identifies five major
“control knobs” of a health system which policymakers
can use to achieve health system goals (financing,
organization, payment, regulation, and behaviour). PBF
interacts strongly with each of these.
Clearly, the choice of indicators to focus on within this
framework will be influenced by particular contextual
needs - including the motivation for undertaking the
monitoring and evaluation, and the design and theory of
change of the particular PBF reform package. It is not
realistic to be exhaustive. However, it is important to
think system-wide and clearly about what might change,
and what is a priority to measure (and why).
The majority of PBF evaluations and monitoring systems
to date have focused on changes to outputs, in terms of in-
creased delivery of targeted services. However, most other
domains in Table 1 have been neglected by researchers.
Good practice indicates that important effects (positive or
negative) should be identified in advance and then actively
monitored. Ex-post observations are less useful than
developing a clear theory of change and then using it to
evaluate, leading to a later revision and fine-tuning of the
theory and implementation.
Although it may seem that some of the elements in
the tables are not necessarily connected to PBF – such
as training on good clinical practice, for example - other
types of inputs do often accompany PBF reform pack-
ages, like capacity building through training, mentoring
and supervision, and coaching and technical assistance
on measurement, use of improved management tools
and how to increase results. These are likely to contrib-
ute to any results, and so should be viewed as a package.
The financial incentives, though central in terms of the
definition of PBF, may not be solely or even, in some
cases, centrally responsible for such changes as occur.
Attribution of effects to any one strand may be compli-
cated, but by clearly documenting the five domains ofcontext, design process, design features, implementa-
tion, and health system effects, plausible linkages can be
made.f
In terms of staff satisfaction, to give one example, it is
to be expected that staff are pleased to receive what is,
in almost all cases, additional funding, and indeed a
number of reports do find this. However, responses are
often nuanced, in that the funding comes with increased
pressures and studies do not always differentiate re-
sponses to levels of pay with responses to the system for
allocating it. The pressures which PBF can put on staff
may be constructive, or unconstructive (e.g. if targeted
results cannot be met because of external constraints).
Involvement in setting targets, ability to control the
factors which affect those targets, perception that the
measurement and reward processes are fair and trans-
parent, and an adequate level of funding of targeted
actions are all factors which are likely to improve staff
responses [21].
Health systems are not closed, and the health systems
framework may prove too narrow to capture all of the
effects of PBF. If it affects staff remuneration, it is likely
to have impacts beyond the health sector, affecting other
public servants’ expectations, for example. Reforms in
health may also influence and be influenced by reforms
in other sectors [7,39]. However, the health system frame
is likely to pick up most and the most significant results,
including (especially within the governance aspects) the
political economy of reforms – changing influence and
benefits to different groups. Political economy analysis
can be a useful tool for investigating this.
Its effect over time is another important area for investi-
gation. Rapid improvements were noted during the start
up of some PBF reform packages but later payments be-
came integrated with health worker remuneration, which
may lead to a leveling off or even a decline in performance
over time, if there is no variation in payments [25]. On the
other hand, payment per output may avoid the problem of
PBF being seen as an ‘acquired right’ [22].
From a funding point of view, sustainability is likely
to depend on a combination of government buy-in, co-
herence with other strategies, good working relations
with donors, perceived and documented good results,
and continued external support [21]. All on-going PBF
packages in LMICs are highly dependent on external
support, though in Rwanda and Burundi the govern-
ment contribution is substantial.
Conclusions
The paper lays out a broad framework within which in-
dicators can be prioritised for monitoring and evaluation
for this and related health system reforms. It encourages
policy makers and researchers to go beyond the few
targeted indicators of a PBF package or similar reform
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and unintended effects and feed-back mechanisms. It
highlights the dynamic linkages between context, process
of development, design, implementation and effects and
between different health system pillars. All of these are
framed within inter-sectoral and wider societal contexts
too. It highlights the importance of differentiating short
term and long term effects, and also effects at different
levels of the health system, and for different sectors
(public, private, mission etc.) and areas of the country.
Unintended effects and also synergies with other strat-
egies are equally important.
Outstanding work, following from this framework, will
include the following:
□ Reaching consensus on models and terminology
within the field
□ Using and refining the framework for PBF and other
health system reforms
□ Discussion of the most important nodes (based on a
theory of change) and appropriate indicators and
mixed methods research tools to measure them
□ Developing hypotheses that can be tested, on, for
example, in what contexts, in response to what types
of challenge, with what design, PBF can strengthen
the health system (or subcomponents of the health
system)
Endnotes
aSee the many postings on the RBF website: http://www.
rbfhealth.org/rbfhealth/.
bSee http://www.abdn.ac.uk/femhealth/documents/
CoPANEL_Beijing2012.pdf.
cSee http://e.itg.be/ihp/archives/pbf-workshop-bergen-
impressions-observations-junior-researcher/ for a de-
scription of this meeting.
dA working group on PBF and equity was launched
recently - see http://www.healthfinancingafrica.org/3/
category/alex%20ergo/1.html.
eSee, for example, early results from Zimbabwe: http://
www.rbfhealth.org/rbfhealth/news/item/657/rural-zimbabwe-
no-more-user-fees-women-and-children.
fIn a linked article, the group plans to explore the ques-
tion of appropriate research methods to investigate some
of these questions.
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